Dr. White graciously took the time to respond to one of my posts where I commented on his critique of middle knowledge. (link) The discussion is in the first part of the broadcast. I had argued that Dr. White's positions that Molinism undermines both LFW and God's sovereignty were inconsistent. Dr. White responds that I misrepresented his arguments and it's possible for a system to have more than one problem.
It's true that I didn't quote Dr. White's comments in their entirety, but I did link to them. But what I did say I believe to be both relevant and accurate. As for systems being able to have more than one problem; I agree. But only if you draw out contradictory premises from inside a system, can you validly assert a contradiction. If one or both of the premises are unacceptable to your opponent and outside their system; they have every right to point out that your assertions are inconsistent. Thus Mark notes about Christ's trial: many bare false witness against him, but their witness agreed not together. (Mark 14:56)
To explain my position (that Dr. White's arguments are inconsistent) I plan to summarize his arguments and draw out the contradiction.
Dr. White's Arguments
Argument #1 - Molinism Undermines LFW
P1: Molinism says God knows what you would do under any circumstance
P2: In any given circumstance, people can only do what God knew they would do
P3: Libertarian free will requires the person to be able to choose A or non-A
C1: So Molinism undermines LFW
Argument #2 - Molinism Undermines God's Sovereignty
P4: Molinism says God knows what you would do under any circumstance
P5: In any given circumstance, our hypothetical free choices limit God's options
P6: God's sovereingy is inconsistent with anything outside of God limiting His options
C2: So Molinism undermines God's sovereignty
P2 is 'external' to Molinism; an idea introduced by James White. Molina himself said the opposite explicitly and repeatedly.1 P2 and P5 imply a contradiction; that we are only able to do one thing and at the same time our ability to do two things limits God's options. One possibility and twofold possibilities... 1=2. A plain contradiction.
If our nature was such that we only had the ability to do one thing (i.e. if we don't have twofold possibilities), then what we do is necessary such that we cannot do otherwise. Necessary items are a part of God's natural knowledge, not His middle knowledge - the very idea of middle knowledge is based on twofold possibilities and yes, God's choice to give us twofold possibilities limited His options.
1For the things that issue forth from our choice or depend on it are not going to happen because they are foreknown by God as going to happen, to the contrary, they are foreknown by God as going to happen in this or that way because they are so going to happen by virtue of our freedom of choice – through if they were going to happen in a contrary way, as they are able to, then from eternity they would be foreknown as going to happen in that contrary way instead of in the way the are in fact foreknown as going to happen – and, indeed the knowledge by which God knew absolutely that such and such things would come to be is not a cause of the things, but rather, once the order of things that we see has been posited by the free determination of the divine will, then (as Origen and the other Fathers observe) the effects will issue forth from their causes – naturally from natural causes, freely and contingently with respect to both parts from free causes – just as if God had no foreknowledge of future events. From this it clearly follows that no prejudice at all is done to freedom of choice or to the contingency of things by God’s foreknowledge, aforeknowledge through which, because of the infinity and wholly unlimited perfection and acumen of His intellect, He sees with certainty what the free causes placed in any order of things will do, even though they could really, if they so willed do the contrary; rather, even though that knowledge exists, freedom of choice and the contingency of things with respect to both parts remains intact, just as if there were no foreknowledge. (Molina Translation by Freddoso. Concordia Disp 52 para 29.)