This is part of an ongoing discussion on determinism... (Paul, me, Paul, me, Paul, me, Paul)
Even if I granted that 21st century common man understands choice in a libertarian way… that doesn't imply that X-century BC Jews thought that way.
Paul is welcome to address the reasons I have already provided, based on the common consent of modern scholarship and extra-biblical Jewish writings.
Dan must grant the possibility that in an increasingly secular society, given the state of public education, and given the direction science is heading; the "common man" will believe this: "All things are physically determined with generalizations and conditionals having 100% probabilities associated with them."
I am not sure the common man is in a position to evaluate that claim.
as I argued from Kane, the common man also has problems with indeterminate happenings.
He only said they would, if they held certain mistaken notions.
Dan writes that the problem with my Princeton definition is that "Alternatives can be chosen. This is why I argued that a predetermined choice entails an impossible possibility and inalternate alternative." But the dictionary doesn't mention the word "can" and Dan also ignores hypothetical compatibilists. Is he going to argue that the dictionary weighs in on classical compatibilism?! Furthermore, compatibilists would agree that a different past, or decree, renders those alternatives the possible ones chosen. Is Dan going to argue that the dictionary weighed in on this?! When Dan says, "impossible" what does he mean? Given the decree of God, the alternative is not something that can genuinely be accessed. But there could be other possible decrees. So, what does he mean? And, can he argue that the dictionary supports this? Dan even admits that he doesn't "recall using the term 'genuine access to'" possibilities. Right, and that defeats his dictionary argument.
Paul mistakenly overlooked the word “can” in my dictionary.com quote (both the explicit reference and implicitly through the word “possible”). So again, the common sense notion of choosing and alternatives rules out determinism.
As for hypotheticals (i.e. if I had wanted to I could have chosen X or if I had chosen X, I could have done X) in reality (given God’s decree and the history of the world) both the counterfactaul choice and act are impossible. And to substitute a hypothetical ability with an actual one is an equivocal way of substituting the common definition of choice for the determinist one.
Finally, there is a difference between understanding what the dictionary says and applying what it says. By Paul asking if the dictionary addresses certain questions, he seems to be conflating these two things.
Lastly, Dan makes a non-sequitur. He says, "Again, if determinism is true, given the causal forces at play, I cannot choose or do counterfactuals." But, that doesn't mean you didn't choose to do what you did.
Sure it does, because given the common notion of choosing, the counterfactuals are possible, not impossible.
And, again, if libertarianism is true, given the luck, I cannot choose counterfactuals. Choosing requires a certain amount of control that libertarianism doesn't afford. Dan disagrees.
The bible disagrees, and I simply believe the bible. This “luck” line of reasoning is the one I warned about earlier as not open to the Christian. In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth. This means God is the first cause, so His first cause wasn’t causally predetermined. This is agent causation and it undermines the luck argument. Was God lucky to have Jacob? No, He chose him. But Paul’s reasoning would lead us to believe God was lucky. Arguments against the coherence of LFW are impermissible to Christians.
The dictionary doesn't say Jesus is the God-man, ergo, he isn't.
In this case the dictionary is accurate, but not complete. But regarding “chose”, Paul would have us believe the dictionary is inaccurate and he has provided counter-definitions.
As for Muslims using the word “choose”, if I recall correctly they hold Allah transcends logic. So probably they hold to both and neither determinism and LFW. Why should we expect them to be consistent?
As for the Gospel not being common sense, I would say that dead faith actually is among the common responses to the Gospel, but it’s true that justifying faith requires the inward illumination of the Holy Spirit.